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The status of Kosovo continues to controversial. Pristina and Belgrade are 
now even more at loggerheads than they were before the Kosovar Decla-
ration of Independence in February 2008. Diverging interests in the EU 
and the United Nations have paralyzed the work of the international 
community.  It is clear that the EU needs a new policy with which to cre-
ate stability and make for clarity. Pristina must show some responsibility 
if it does not wish to jeopardize the future of Kosovo. 
Only a few months after the Declaration of 
Independence the young state of Kosovo 
finds itself bogged down in a fundamental 
crisis in which the whole issue of the sov-
ereignty of the country is at stake. In con-
trast to what the proponents of independ-
ence had planned, during the past twelve 
months the international community has 
not managed to come up with a new legal 
framework for the missions on the ground. 
The international actors continue to be 
bound by Security Resolution 1244 (UN-
SCR 1244) from the year 1999. This is re-
pudiated by the young state with its claim 
to sovereignty and the European states 
which have recognized Kosovo. The result 
of all this is a confused state of affairs 
which hinders the emergence of positive 
developments and exacerbates conflicts. 
I 
What has happened since 
the Declaration of  
Independence? 
The Kosovo Declaration of Independence 
in February 2008 was preceded by lengthy 
and nerve-racking negotiations. The proc-
ess was set in motion by the Norwegian 
diplomat Kai Eide, who in his report to the 
UN Secretary General in October 2005 in-
dicated that it was imperative to resolve 
the status question. 
 
The former Finnish president Martti Ahti-
saari was entrusted with the task of work-
ing out a compromise with Serbian and 
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Kosovar representatives. In March 2007 
Ahtisaari presented a plan which contains 
fundamental guarantees for the Serbian 
minority in Kosovo and envisages condi-
tional independence for Kosovo under in-
ternational supervision. 
 
Although the Ahtisaari package is the net 
result of lengthy negotiations and contains 
detailed compromises with regard to dis-
puted issues, the negotiations and the 
ensuing endeavours of the troika (EU, 
Russia, U.S.) ended inconclusively at 
the end of 2007. Serbia exercised its 
veto rights against every step which 
might have led to the resolution of the 
status question and ultimately to inde-
pendence. At the same time the political 
process, once begun, could no longer be 
stopped. Openly supported by the U.S. 
and expecting to obtain unanimous ap-
proval from the EU, Pristina declared 
itself independent on 17 February 2008. 
On 15 June the first constitution of the 
new state entered into force. Both the 
Declaration of Independence and the 
constitution of the Republic of Kosovo 
refer to the Ahtisaari plan and its im-
plementation. 
 
Before the Declaration of Independence 
the EU had given the impression of be-
ing united on the issue. As late as 4 
February 2008 the 27 EU member 
states emphasized that they were will-
ing to assume a leading role if Kosovo 
agreed to implement the Ahtisaari plan. 
It was unanimously agreed to despatch 
the EULEX rule of law mission and an 
EU special representative for Kosovo.  
 
Yet since the Kosovar Declaration of In-
dependence the EU is no longer in 
agreement on the issue. Whereas 53 UN 
states, including the neighbouring 
states of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia 
and Montenegro, have recognized Kos-
ovo, five EU states have still not done 
so–Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain 
and Cyprus. They refuse to recognize 
Kosovo for reasons associated with do-
mestic policy issues and international 
legal reservations. 
 
The international community also remains 
divided on the issue. The expected wave of 
recognition from other regions, including 
the Islamic and Latin American countries, 
has hitherto failed to materialize. Russia, 
which until the middle of 2006 still sup-
ported the views of the Balkans Contact 
Group (Germany, France, the United King- 
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dom, Italy, U.S., and Russia) on the nego-
tiations under Ahtisaari, is using Kosovo 
to further its global political ambitions. 
Despite the fact that it has counteracted 
its own arguments based on international 
law by its recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhasia, in the United Nations Security 
Council Moscow has blocked all attempts 
to re-order the legal framework for the in-
ternational presence in Kosovo. 
 
II 
Status revisited: Belgrade 
has the upper hand 
With the backing of Moscow Belgrade is 
pursuing a policy aimed at bringing the 
sluggish recognition process to a complete 
standstill and once again making the issue 
of the status of Kosovo the subject of nego-
tiations. 
 
Furthermore, the Serbian gov-
ernment has pulled off a stroke 
of diplomatic genius. At the UN 
General Assembly on 8 October 
2008 77 states, including Mon-
tenegro, supported the Serbian 
resolution requesting the Inter-
national Court of Justice at The 
Hague to assess the legality of 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Six countries, includ-
ing the U.S., voted against the 
resolution, and 74 abstained 
(including the neighbouring 
states of Bosnia, Croatia and 
Macedonia). The EU member 
states disguised their differ-
ences by abstaining. The ruling 
of the Court is not binding. 
However, if The Hague were to decide in 
favour of Belgrade, states which have al-
ready recognized Kosovo would be in deep 
trouble. 
 
Belgrade embarked on another attempt to 
turn back the clock at the end of Novem-
ber, when President Tadic called into 
question the Kumanovo Treaty, which for-
bids Serbian troop movements in Kosovo 
and in the border areas adjoining the for-
mer Serbian province. 
 
In practice Serbia continues to resist the 
new realities. It simply refused to cooper-
ate with the European EULEX rule of law 
mission and the International Civilian Of-
fice (ICO), which were set up on the basis 
of the Ahtisaari plans after the Declaration 
of Independence. Belgrade recognizes only 
the United Nations mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), which operates on the basis of 
UNSCR 1244. 
 
Since June 2008 UN Secretary General Ban 
has been trying to find a way out of this 
impasse. He attempted to obtain Bel-
grade’s support for the reconfiguration of 
UNMIK and the deployment of EULEX, and 
put forward six points on which Belgrade 
should in future continue to have a say. 
The proposals suggested that in the Ser-
bian enclaves and in the north of Kosovo 
matters relating to customs, police, jus-
tice, transport, telecommunications, and 
religious and cultural heritage would con-
tinue to be dealt with under the aegis of 
UNSCR 1244, whereas EULEX would oper-
ate under the umbrella of the United Na-
tions, that is, of UNMIK. 
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Pristina did not participate in the negotia-
tions between Belgrade, New York and 
Brussels. It was easy to understand why 
the Kosovar leader-
ship should have 
rejected the results 
with which it was 
confronted. Kosovo 
was in a quandary. 
Acceptance of the 
six-point plan 
would have been 
tantamount to un-
dermining its sov-
ereignty. Its inter-
nationally super-
vised independ-
ence, which is 
based on the Ahti-
saari package and 
enshrined in the 
constitution, would 
have seemed totally 
absurd. However, if 
it rejects the six-
point plan, the deployment of EULEX will 
be endangered and relations to the EU and 
the United Nations strained to the limits. 
 
III 
Status Neutral: OSCE and 
The UN administration
et things were about to turn out differ-
he police in areas mainly inhabited by 
he OSCE will also remain. In Ban’s report 
UNMIK 
 found itself in a 
difficult position after the Declaration of 
Independence, and especially after the en-
try into force of the constitution. The di-
lemma was due to the fact that UNSCR 
1244, on which the mandate of UNMIK is 
based, continued to be in existence, 
whereas there is no mention of UNMIK in 
the Kosovar constitution. The intention 
had been that UNMIK would operate in 
Kosovo only until EULEX had become fully 
operative. 
 
Y
ently. On 26 November 2008, after Bel-
grade, Brussels and Ban Ki-Moon had 
reached agreement on the six-point plan, 
the Security Council gave its assent to the 
deployment of EULEX within the frame-
work of UNSCR 1244 and under the um-
brella of UNMIK, which thus continues in 
existence. The transfer of the full mandate 
to EULEX and the withdrawal of UNMIK 
are now dependent on Belgrade. 
 
T
Serbs will continue to be under the super-
vision of UNMIK structures and is thus 
beyond the control of Pristina. The same is 
true of customs. Here again UNMIK will 
supervise the border crossings between 
northern Kosovo and Serbia, and not the 
government of Kosovo. In northern Mi-
trovica the judiciary will remain in the 
hands of UNMIK for up to 60 days until  
local judges and state prosecutors working 
on the basis of UNSCR 1244, which re-
mains in force, and not the Kosovar consti-
tution, will start their work. 
 
T
to the Security Council it is in fact as-
signed a key role. Its members–and in this 
they resemble the EU–do not agree with 
regard to the status question. Yet the 
OSCE has only a political and consultative 
mandate, and not an internationally bind- 
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ing one. Furthermore, the organization has 
to defer to its member states Russia and 
Serbia–and is thus status-neutral. If the 
Ahtisaari plan were in force, the OSCE 
would support the work of the Interna-
tional Civilian Office (ICO). However, co-
operation with the ICO is officially impos-
sible. 
 
IV 
Difficult Status: Interna-
The November report of the Se
utch diplomat Pieter Feith in his role as 
he steering group has commissioned the 
nly specialists make a distinction be-
he European Council has decided to des-
“Dual function causes 
Basically co a way 
ccording to the Ahtisaari plan the task of 
tional Civilian Office 
cretary 
General of the United Nations to the Secu-
rity Council describes the OSCE as a “cen-
tral element” of UNMIK, and emphasizes 
its key role in the establishment and su-
pervision of Kosovar institutions. How-
ever, the ICO is mentioned not once in the 
whole document. 
 
D
International Civilian Representative (ICR) 
will find it very difficult to move to Kosovo 
in order to perform the consultative and 
interventionist functions stipulated in the 
Ahtisaari plan. Although the plans had en-
visaged that the UN Security Council 
would give its assent to the appointment 
of the ICR, UNSCR 1244 continues to re-
main in force. Feith’s mandate thus de-
rives only from those states which have 
recognized Kosovo and their International 
Steering Group (ISG), over which he pre-
sides. 
 
T
ICR to supervise the implementation of the 
Ahtisaari package. As the recently pub-
lished ICO implementation matrix demon-
strates, Peter Feith has done a great deal 
of consultative work for the Kosovar insti-
tutions since the Declaration of Independ-
ence. However, the bomb attack on the ICO 
building on 14 November shows that the 
ICO is working in a difficult political envi-
ronment. 
 
 
O
tween ICO and EULEX, and the status of 
ICO and ICR are unclear to both the inter-
national actors and the population of Kos-
ovo. Since the UN Security Council has 
again given UNMIK the task of spearhead-
ing the international supervisory process, 
ICO lacks a robust mandate and the ques-
tion thus arises of the extent to which the 
Kosovar institutions are willing to follow 
advice emanating from ICR. 
 
T
patch an EU special representative (EUSR) 
in conjunction with EULEX. The ICR Pieter 
Feith, as stipulated in the Ahtisaari plan, 
is also the EUSR. This dual function is be-
ginning increasingly to cause difficulties. 
Whereas the ICR is supposed to supervise 
the government of the Republic of Kosovo, 
opinions differ with regard to the function 
of the EUSR in the 22 pro-recognition and 
5 anti-recognition states.   
 difficulties“ 
nceived as no more than 
of coordinating EU activities in Kosovo, 
the EUSR function is becoming more and 
more important, and makes it necessary to 
walk a never-ending tightrope. It is sup-
posed to promote the consistency of EU ac-
tivities and as to advise and support the 
political process. However, some openly 
aired disagreements between ICR/EUSR 
Pieter Feith and Pierre Mirel of the Euro-
pean Commission concerning the leader-
ship and steering function of EULEX shed 
a revealing light on the imperfection of the 
coordinating processes within the EU, and 
make the tensions implicit in the confused 
and impenetrable system plain for all to 
see. 
 
A
coordinating the international actors in 
Kosovo should have been assigned to a 
committee headed by Pieter Feith. How-
ever, since in accordance with its mandate 
the ICO must be pro-status, it cannot per-
form this function. Exchange and coordi- 
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K
o
s
o
v
o
 
2
0
0
9
:
 
U
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
 
F
u
t
u
r
e
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
6
 
#
 
2
0
0
9
/
0
1
 
nation can perhaps take place on an in-
formal basis. International civil involve-
ment thus runs the risk of not acting con-
jointly, at best of duplicating itself, and in 
a worst-case scenario of getting caught up 
in grotesque quarrels about who is re-
sponsible for what. 
 
V 
Confused Status: EULEX 
The EU rule of law m
he UN Security Council unanimously 
he fact that the U.S. representative in the 
 needs to be remembered that the EU de-
“Credibility of ESDP  
mission is already being 
These attempts to square the circle be-
ccording to the Action Plan the EUSR is 
ission had taken 
some knocks as a result of discussions 
about the legality of its actions, the extent 
of its mandate, and the time and place of 
its operations before it began work on 9 
December. The credibility of the hitherto 
largest ESDP mission is already being que-
ried and this calls into question the effi-
ciency of the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy. 
 
T
gave the go-ahead for EULEX on 26 No-
vember 2008. The basis for its work is 
now Ban Ki-moon’s report, which places 
EULEX under UNMIK. Thus EULEX will act 
as a technical mission and be status-
neutral. But what does the status-
neutrality actually signify for EULEX? Can 
the establishment of the rule of law be 
neutral and disregard the fact of state-
hood? What significance will the Kosovar 
constitution have if there are two simulta-
neous jurisdictions, that of UNMIK in the 
Serbian enclaves and that of the Kosovar 
constitution? 
 
T
Security Council ascribes a “complemen-
tary” role to the Kosovar government and 
that the UN report talks of a “provisional 
solution” is not particularly helpful. Apart 
from the immense damage to the reputa-
tions of the international organizations in 
Kosovo on account of months of squab-
bling, the Security Council decision estab-
lishes an action programme which can 
hardly attain its goal. Those who believe 
that the Kosovar population and govern-
ment will be satisfied with the fact that a 
statement outlining Pristina’s reasoned re-
jection of the arrangement is appended to 
the UN report will be deceiving himself. 
Kosovo has agreed to EULEX primarily be-
cause it opens the prospect of integration 
into NATO and the EU. 
 
It
cided on the rule of law mission unani-
mously. However, its interpretation re-
veals a rift between two camps as soon as 
it is a matter of the status-related defini-
tion of its deployment and mandate. The 
EU states which have recognized Kosovo 
interpret the decision on EULEX (Joint Ac-
tion Plan, 4 February 2008) to mean that 
EULEX will work together with the Kos-
ovar institutions and authorities. The op-
posite point of view rests on the notion 
that the Joint Action Plan was only ac-
cepted on the basis that EULEX did not 
prejudge the status issue and was thus 
consonant with UNSCR 1244. 
queried.“ 
come rather grotesque as soon as it is a 
question of determining EULEX’s place in 
the “chain of command.” According to the 
Joint Action Plan the head of EULEX, Yves 
de Kermabon, receives orders from the 
EU’s PSC (Committee for Policy and Secu-
rity) and Javier Solana. As Belgrade and 
the UN Secretary General see it (status-
neutrality, UNSCR 1244, no implementa-
tion of the Ahtisaari plan), EULEX, like the 
OSCE, will operate under the UN mandate 
or, as is sometimes said, under the “UN 
umbrella.” 
 
A
to provide the head of EULEX with “politi-
cal leadership on the ground” in all areas 
of executive responsibility. But what steer-
ing function is Pieter Feith supposed to 
perform if within the EU itself it is impos-
sible to discern a clear-cut policy line? 
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VI 
Challenges 
EU Commiss  
) Despite its internal lack of unanimity, 
nited action is absolutely necessary in 
) The EU member states represented in 
) Kosovo must also convince the doubters 
) The state-building process in the young-
) Special attention must be paid to the re-
 
ioner Oli Rehn has declared
2009 to be the year of the Western Bal-
kans. The forthcoming EU presidencies of 
the Czech Republic and of Sweden will 
have to demonstrate whether or not this 
signifies the development of a more posi-
tive state of affairs, especially in Kosovo. 
The EU must make clear-cut decisions if it 
does not wish to harm the development of 
Kosovo and thus of the whole of south-east 
Europe for years to come. The actors in 
Brussels and Pristina must bear five 
points in mind. 
 
1
the EU must create a coherent framework 
for its policies. The success of EULEX 
stands or falls with the backing which the 
ESDP mission has in the EU. The EU can 
only exert pressure on the governments in 
Pristina and Belgrade if it whole-heartedly 
supports the medium-term deployment of 
EULEX throughout Kosovo and ties in Bel-
grade and above all Pristina.  
 
U
view of the fact that the EU’s own reputa-
tion is at stake. The U.S. is a staunch sup-
porter of Kosovar independence and is tak-
ing part in a European mission for the 
very first time. It needs an EU which is a 
reliable partner no longer bogged down in 
complex decision-making processes. 
 
2
the ISG must insist on the implementation 
of the Ahtisaari package and on strength-
ening the ICO. In addition to this it is also 
imperative to pre-empt any attempt to 
drive a wedge between the member states 
of the EU in technical and execution pro-
visions. A pragmatic willingness to com-
promise, as is being demonstrated by Slo-
vakia and Greece, two non-recognition 
states, with regard to the recognition of 
Kosovo passports, opens up further room 
for manoeuvre. 
 
3
within the EU. This will only be possible if 
it implements European standards in a 
consistent and comprehensive manner. 
Greece, which assumes the OSCE presi-
dency in 2009, Romania, which has sec-
onded policemen to EULEX could thus be 
persuaded to move towards recognition. 
The Kosovar elite must demonstrate that it 
understands its responsibilities and act 
accordingly. 
 
4
est state in the world has only just begun. 
For the Kosovar government institutions 
the UN report and the deployment of 
EULEX under a UN mandate constitute a 
great burden. But Pristina must continue 
to adhere to the Ahtisaari plan–despite 
and perhaps on account of the difficult cir-
cumstances. The disunity of the interna-
tional community should not lead to a 
situation which makes it impossible to 
proceed with the democratization of Kos-
ovo. Pristina’s government institutions are 
no longer “provisional.” They serve their 
country and their people. There can be no 
doubt about the fact that for the future the 
country needs a great deal of help in the 
areas of justice and public administration, 
and that here EULEX will perform essen-
tial tasks. The government cannot longer 
afford unprofessional and offensive behav-
iour as in the case of the arrest recently of 
members of the German intelligence ser-
vice BND. It needs to gain confidence in-
ternally and externally. 
 
5
lationship between Kosovo Albanians and 
Kosovo Serbs. The politicians in Pristina 
have hitherto failed to build a common fu-
ture based on a specific set of measures. 
The difficult living conditions and the lack 
of economic prospects are a great source 
of anxiety for the population as a whole 
and the Serbs in particular. Pristina needs 
to make pro-active overtures to the Serbs 
in the country and develop a vision for a 
joint state. Specific and sustainable sup-
port for local economic areas in the en-
claves must be a top priority.  
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K
o
s
o
v
o
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
E
U
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e
 
8
 
#
 
2
0
0
9
/
0
1
About the authors: 
 
Johanna Deimel is former Deputy Director of the German Southeast Europe Association and was 
d by 
rmando García Schmidt is Project Manager at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. 
or Further Reading:  
osovar Institute for Policy Research and Development: Looking beyond Mitrovica Bridge: An 
ternational Crisis Group: “Kosovo’s Fragile Transition”. Europe Report No 196 – 25 September 2008. 
arie-Janine Calic: Kosovo: der jüngste Staat Europas. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 32/2008, pp. 33-
hanna Deimel / Wim van Meurs (eds.): The Balkan Prism. A Retrospective by Policy-Makers and 
edran Dzihic / Helmut Kramer: Der Kosovo nach der Unabhängigkeit, Internationale Politikanalyse, 
esponsible 
ertelsmann Stiftung 
e 256 
iftung.de
r. Dominik Hierlemann 
elsmann.de
achim Fritz-Vannahme 
lsmann.de
SN 1865-7451 
Latest editions: 
otlight europe # 2008/13 
 
otlight europe # 2008/12 
otlight europe # 2008/11 
hme 
ll editions of the spotlight europe can be 
involved as Executive Officer / Chief of Staff in the set-up of the International Civilian Office heade
Pieter Feith. 
 
A
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
 
K
“Ahtisaari Plus” Package Proposal; Policy Brief Series, Paper 9, October 2008. 
 
In
 
M
40. 
 
Jo
Analysts. Munich, 2007. 
 
V
September 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
 
B
Carl Bertelsmann Straß
D-33311 Gütersloh 
www.bertelsmann-st
 
D
dominik.hierlemann@bert
Telefon +49 5241 81 81537 
 
Jo
joachim.vannahme@berte
Telefon +49 5241 81 81421 
 
 
 
 
IS
 
sp
Lessons from the Treaty Fatigue
Dominik Hierlemann 
 
sp
Welcome Back, America? 
Josef Janning 
 
sp
Solidarity in the EU 
Joachim Fritz-Vanna
 
 
 
A
downloaded from: www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/spotlight 
 